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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides an analysis of the effect of the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) on 
freight flows between Mozambique and South Africa. By analysing the transport 
infrastructure of the MDC, this paper seeks to provide insight into the relationship between 
investment in infrastructure and economic growth.  
 
This paper shows that the MDC is likely to reduce freight transport costs along the route, in 
spite of new road tolls .  The MDC has strengthened old infrastructure relationships as 
indicated by a rapid response from bulk exports along the corridor route from Mpumalanga. 
However, it has yet to create significant new infrastructure relationships, such as container 
imports to South Africa via the corridor route. This paper also shows that factors outside of 
the MDC will influence the impact of the corridor, such as the price of tolls on the N3 to 
Durban. 
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1. Introduction 
The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) is widely recognised as an initiative with far 
reaching significance. Some of the reasons for this are that: 
· it represents a new approach within the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) to corridors; 
· it is seen as an important practical move towards regional integration, which can provide 
practical lessons for other corridors in the region; 
· one of its key elements is the region’s first major public-private partnership (PPP); 
· it heralds a new era in the relationship between Mozambique and South Africa. 
The recent history of the MDC goes back to August 1995, when the Ministers of Transport in 
Mozambique and South Africa reached an agreement to re-establish the route between Gauteng 
and Maputo. This was a major transport route until the mid-1970s, when the war in 
Mozambique and South Africa’s destabilisation activities disrupted it. 
At the core of the MDC is a series of projects to upgrade the infrastructure that makes up the 
transport route from Gauteng to Maputo. This includes four major elements: the road, the 
railway line, the border post and the port of Maputo. These infrastructure upgrades underpin the 
MDC initiative. It is envisaged not only that the flow of goods along the route will be re-
established, but that the investment in infrastructure will crowd in further investment, or, as 
expressed by the Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, “attract new and value-added industries 
along the length and breadth of the Corridor” (Mpumalanga Report 1999). 
There is a well-established relationship between infrastructure and economic development. 
Widespread empirical evidence shows a correlation between investment in infrastructure and 
economic growth, and from a theoretical point of view it makes sense that infrastructure 
facilitates economic growth by increasing the productivity of other factors of production. 
However, beyond the level of a broad correlation, the nature of the relationship between 
infrastructure and economic development is relatively poorly understood. As Kessides (1993: 9) 
points out, “the available studies are not very illuminating regarding the workings of this 
relationship and therefore the policy implications are not clear.” (Also see Batten & Karlsson 
1996; and Smit & McCarthy 1998.) Questions that remain unanswered include: Under what 
conditions does infrastructure act as an effective catalyst for economic growth? Can 
infrastructure be a “leading” factor in stimulating growth in underdeveloped regions? 
The MDC represents an opportunity to examine this relationship between infrastructure and 
economic growth in action, and to explore the mechanisms at work. Apart from furthering our 
understanding of the MDC, this may provide insights and lessons that would be valuable for 
other development corridors in the region. 
Transport infrastructure in particular is seen to play an important role in regional integration, 
and has even been termed “the engine of regional integration” (Lipman 1997: 85). Lipman 
explains that, “Many of the non-tariff barriers to trade are related to transport, and all regional 
and international markets in goods, services and labour are dependent on transport and 
transport linkages.” 
The various corridors in the region have the potential to facilitate movement of goods 
between different parts of the region, and between the region and the rest of the world, as well as 
the potential to promote investment and development in particular local areas. It is this 
combination of possibilities which makes them so attractive. They offer the prospect of increased 
trade, increased investment, and local economic development. However, as stated, the 
mechanisms by which this process works are not fully understood. 
Because the infrastructure in the case of the MDC is chiefly transport infrastructure, one 
important mechanism at work in the relationship between the MDC and economic growth is 
likely to be transport costs, and the transport of goods along the corridor is an obvious starting 
point for understanding the impact of the infrastructure upgrades.  
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With this in mind, the aims of this paper are: 
· to build up a picture of current flows along the Maputo corridor; 
· to examine the likely impact of the MDC on road freight transport costs; 
· to explore some of the other factors that mediate the relationship between investment in 
infrastructure and economic development in the case of the MDC.1 
Ultimately the goal is to illuminate the workings of the relationship between investment in 
infrastructure and economic growth, in the context of a particular set of infrastructure investments aimed 
at realising regional integration and industrialisation. 
The MDC is in its early stages. Much of the infrastructure upgrading that is at the core of the initiative 
has yet to take place. Any attempt at an overall evaluation of the impact of the MDC would be premature 
at this stage. However, an investigation at this early stage of some of the factors at work may provide 
useful insights about what is needed for effective ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the MDC’s 
longer-term impact. 
The paper is based on research undertaken jointly by the DPRU at UCT, and CEEI-ISRI in Maputo. 
Data was collected from secondary sources as well as through interviews and conversations with people 
and firms involved in and affected by the MDC. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some background on Mozambique and South 
Africa, and the MDC itself. Section 3 focuses on the infrastructure upgrades that form part of the MDC. 
Section 4 gives information about freight, vehicle and passenger flows along the MDC route. Section 5 
explores the likely impact of the MDC on freight flows, as a result of changes in road freight transport 
costs as well as broader factors. Section 6 presents conclusions and recommendations. 
 
                                                                 
1 Please note that this paper does not aim to give a comprehensive account of the MDC. It does not deal with the 
institutional arrangements through which the MDC is being implemented, nor does it deal with elements of the 
MDC programme apart from the infrastructure upgrades. 
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2. The Context: South Africa and Mozambique 
The MDC takes place in the context of the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique. It is 
useful to look briefly at some of the major current economic features of this relationship, as well as 
how the MDC relates to other priorities and initiatives in each country. 
South Africa’ s GDP was approximately $130 billion in 1997 (SADC 1999), while revised figures for 
1997 put Mozambique’s GDP at $2 billion (Business Day 26.06.98). With a population of about 40 million, 
South Africa’s GDP per capita is about $3 000. With a population of about 18 million, Mozambique has a 
GDP per capita of just over $100. These stark contrasts cannot fail to influence the way the MDC plays 
itself out, and the impact that it has. 
Further, South Africa is one of Mozambique’s major trading partners, while Mozambique accounts 
for a small proportion of South Africa’s trade (see Section A of the Appendix). South Africa has also 
become a major investor in Mozambique. With $1.65 billion of South African investment pledged 
between 1995 and mid-1998 through CPI (Mozambique’s investment promotion agency), South Africa 
surpassed Portugal as the biggest investor in Mozambique (Business Day 22.06.98).2 
In addition, Mozambique has a significant migrant and working community in South Africa. In the 
colonial period, the south of Mozambique was economically integrated with South Africa, as a source of 
labour for mining and agriculture. After Mozambique’s independence, the number of Mozambicans 
working on South Africa’s mines dropped dramatically, from 120 000 to less than 30 000, but has risen 
steadily again since then, to about 80 000 in 1998 (De Vletter 1998). 
Apart from mineworkers, many Mozambicans travel to South Africa in search of work, often illegally. 
According to the South African High Commission in Maputo, 77 000 illegal Mozambican immigrants 
were repatriated from South Africa in the first nine months of 1998. 
South Africa is also an important source of visitors for Mozambique’s rapidly growing tourism 
industry. Revenues from tourism in 1998 were 70% greater than in 1997.  
All of this means that South Africa looms far larger in the Mozambican economy than vice versa, as a 
market for exports, as a source of imports, as a source of investment, as a source of employment, and as a 
source of tourists. This is hardly a new insight, but it is worth repeating here since it bears directly on the 
impact of the MDC. 
It is also worth noting that Mozambique’s harbours and railways have always handled more 
international freight than national freight (see Section B of the Appendix). Mozambique’s strategic 
geographical location, with a long coastline and a large hinterland of landlocked countries, positions the 
country to play a role as a trade and commerce centre in the region. Mozambique has been described as 
“an economy of ports and railroads” (Grundy 1979 in Iheduru 1996: 5). However, the country was also, 
in 1973, the sixth largest manufacturer in sub-Saharan Africa (De Vletter 1998). 
It is important for South Africans to be aware that the area of Mozambique that forms part of the 
MDC is just one small part of the country. The city of Maputo and Maputo Province are also the 
wealthiest part of Mozambique. Estimates of the proportion of Mozambique’s industry located in 
Maputo vary from 33% (Wood 1998) to 70% (Zimconsult 1996), with people interviewed suggesting 
between 50% and two-thirds. This is in spite of two other corridor initiatives. The Beira Corridor links the 
port of Beira with Harare, and the Nacala corridor links the port of Nacala with Liliongwe and Lusaka. 
Although the port of Nacala is one of best natural deep sea harbours in Africa, the Nacala corridor is the 
least developed of the three corridor initiatives (see Sections C and D of the Appendix). Its hinterland is 
also the least industrially developed. 
                                                                 
2 Key investors include the Industrial Development Corporation, Mondi, Shoprite, Sasol, SAB, Illovo sugar, 
Standard Bank, Barlows, Concor, and Anglo American (Business Day 26.06.98). 
THE IMPACT OF THE MAPUTO DEVELOPMENT CORRIDOR ON FREIGHT FLOWS  
 
5 
 
To counteract industrial concentration in the south of Mozambique, a set of spatially differentiated tax 
incentives exists. Crudely speaking, the further north a firm locates within Mozambique, the greater the 
tax rebates available. In addition, Industrial Free Zones have been declared at Maputo, Beira and Nacala. 
 
 
 
From South Africa’s point of view, the MDC is the flagship of the government’s Spatial Development 
Initiatives (SDI) programme. The SDI programme, which began in 1996 with the MDC, is aimed at 
unlocking the economic potential of particular areas of the country, through investment in infrastructure 
and anchor projects in those areas. The approach used in the SDI programme is being extended to other 
development corridors in the region. 
The MDC also fits into the Department of Transport’s recently developed Moving South Africa 
strategy. One of the key requirements identified by Moving South Africa for the freight transport system 
is to consolidate and build density along particular corridors. One of these is the Maputo corridor. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the MDC has not emerged out of nowhere. Before 1975, around 
40% of Gauteng’s industrial exports were transported along the Maputo corridor route and exported 
through the port of Maputo.3 In the first half of the 1970s, the port handled about 14 million tons a year. 
Following Mozambique’s independence, cargo levels at the port dropped dramatically to around 1 
million tons. Railway lines leading to Maputo (and other Mozambican ports) were sabotaged and fell 
into disrepair. South Africa’s exports and those of other landlocked countries in Mozambique’s 
hinterland, were diverted to Durban and Richards Bay, dramatically increasing the region’s dependence 
on South Africa’s transport infrastructure. Although traffic levels at the Maputo port are climbing again, 
at about 3 million tons a year, they still have a long way to go before returning to the 1970s levels. 
Within SADC in the 1980s, the Maputo corridor was not seen as a priority, since investing in the 
corridor’s infrastructure would have benefited South Africa. More attention was paid to the Beira and 
Nacala corridors. Now, two decades after Mozambique’s independence, attention is once again being 
paid to the Maputo corridor. In the interim, the port of Durban has grown enormously and has become 
by far the biggest container port in the region, and the port of Richards Bay, which did not exist in the 
early 1970s, has emerged as a major bulk port. It is in this context, very different from the pre-1975 
context, that the MDC initiative is taking  place. 
 
                                                                 
3 The Mozambique Convention, which became defunct after Mozambique’s independence,  “required that 47.5% 
of traffic from the Southern Transvaal use the Maputo port in return for South Africa’s right to recruit labourers 
from Southern Mozambique for work in its gold and coal mines” (Chipeta, Nkomo, Banda & Ngwenya 1993: 15). 
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3. Key infrastructure elements of the MDC 
Figure 1 shows some of the key events in the life of the MDC. As is to be expected with an ambitious 
undertaking involving two countries with different economies, different institutional cultures, and 
different languages, the MDC is taking time to implement. This section gives some basic information 
about transport infrastructure investments that form the core of the MDC. The element of the 
infrastructure upgrade which has seen the most progress so far is the road. 
3.1 The road 
The concession for the Witbank-Maputo toll road was awarded to Trans African Concessions (TRAC) 
in May 1997, financial closure was reached in December 1997, and construction began in June 1998. 
The $400 million concession is structured as a 30-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement. 
TRAC is responsible for upgrading the road and maintaining it, in return for revenue earned from 
tolls at five points along the road. After 30 years, the asset (the road) will be transferred back to the 
governments of South Africa and Mozambique (who may decide on a further concession agreement). 
In other words, TRAC has 30 years to recoup the cost of its investment plus ongoing maintenance 
(and make a commercial return) from revenue earned from tolls. 
Most of the 440km road requires selective upgrading and rehabilitation, however, TRAC will build a 
new road to cover the last 50km stretch from Moamba to Maputo (also cutting 20km off the route). The 
90km stretch of the road in Mozambique will account for a third of the project’s total cost (Business Report 
22.06.99). TRAC started on the South African side, and is progressing eastwards, with completion likely 
by early 2001. The stretch of road which currently links Moamba and Maputo is not TRAC’s 
responsibility to maintain. According to an engineer from TRAC, this section of the road is in extremely 
bad condition and is falling further into disrepair. 
There will ultimately be five toll plazas along the route, three in South Africa and two in Maputo. The 
three in South Africa (Middelburg, Machado and Nkomazi) have already been opened. The Moamba toll 
plaza in Mozambique may open as soon as March 2000, and the Maputo toll plaza in early 2001. Details 
of the toll tariffs are given in Section 5.1. 
3.2 The railway line 
There are three railway lines that link the port of Maputo to its hinterland: the 78km Ressano Garcia 
line to South Africa, the 63km Goba line to Swaziland, and the 521km Limpopo line to Zimbabwe. As 
with the rest of Mozambique’s railway lines, these lines are currently owned and operated by CFM, 
Mozambique’s rail and port parastatal. A 15-year concession for the upgrading of each line is 
envisaged. 
In late 1997, a Spoornet-led consortium was identified as the preferred bidder for the Ressano Garcia 
line. (A Portuguese-led consortium, Consortia 2000, was identified for the other two lines.) The Spoornet 
consortium submitted a bid to CFM, and negotiations on the terms of the concession began. However, 
negotiations broke down early this year, and the bid has been shelved. The difficulty seems to be related 
to the value which CFM places on its assets, and the “substantial fixed fee and relatively high proportion 
of annual profits” that CFM requires from Spoornet in return for the right to run the line (Mpumalanga 
Report 1999: 15). 
At the moment, the part of the railway line that is situated in South Africa is electrified, while the part 
in Mozambique is not. The line carries about 1.3 million tons a year, of which nearly a million tons is coal 
(see Section C of the Appendix). As a comparison, COALlink, the Spoornet line from Mpumalanga to 
Richards Bay, carries over 60 million tons of coal a year (Spoornet web site 1999). 
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Figure 1: A timeline of events in the life of the MDC 
 
August 1995 
 
Agreement between Ministers of Transport in Mozambique and South Africa to re-
establish the Gauteng-Maputo link 
 
6 May 1996 MDC officially launched at an Investors Conference 
 
26 July 1996 Framework Agreement for the establishment of the MDC signed by Mozambican and 
South African governments, with three ancillary agreements (a protocol for the operation 
of the toll road, a statement of intent to establish a Corridor Company, and a statement of 
intent about upgrading the railway and harbour) 
 
May 1997 Witbank-Maputo toll road concession awarded to TRAC 
 
September 1997 Shoprite opens a store in Maputo 
 
December 1997 Financial closure on toll road concession 
 
December 1997 Spoornet-led consortium named preferred bidder for the concession to operate the 
Ressano Garcia railway line 
 
April 1998 Trans-Kalahari Highway opened 
 
May 1998 Mersey Docks-led consortium named preferred bidder for the concession to operate the 
Maputo port 
 
6 June 1998 Construction of toll road officially launched at Ressano Garcia 
 
July 1998 Construction of Mozal officially launched 
 
August 1998 Mozal concludes agreement with CFM to develop and operate its own port facilities 
 
28 Sept - 1 Oct 1998 3-day strike by construction workers at Mozal over wages and working conditions 
 
1 December 1998 US-Mozambique bilateral investment treaty signed 
 
8 December 1998 Middelburg toll plaza opened 
 
19 Jan 1999 Another strike by construction workers at Mozal 
 
February 1999 Negotiations on the rail concession break down 
 
30 April 1999 Framework agreement signed for MISP and Pande gas field 
 
18 May 1999 Machado toll plaza opened 
 
27 May 1999 Contract for N3 concession signed with N3TC 
 
July 1999 Nkomazi toll plaza opened 
 
March? 2000 Moamba toll plaza to open 
 
Early 2001 Road scheduled to be completed 
Maputo toll plaza to open 
Mozal scheduled to come on stream 
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3.3 The port 
The port of Maputo has terminals for containers, sugar, citrus, steel, general cargo, cereals, fuel, and 
coal. The combined capacity of the port is 15 million tons a year. The operation of the citrus, sugar, 
coal and container terminals was contracted out to the private sector in the mid-1990s. “These 
concessions have improved the efficiency, security and throughput of the port” (SA Transport 
Business Special 1997: 14). The concession for the sugar terminal is held by Manica Freight Services, a 
division of Rennies, together with the Swaziland Sugar Association and the Zimbabwe Sugar 
Association. Manica also has a share in the citrus terminal, along with Capespan Mozambique, a 
subsidiary of the South African company, Capespan. 
The container terminal is operated by Mozambique International Port Services (MIPS), a joint venture 
company owned by Rennies Group (37%), CFM (33%), and P&O Ports, a subsidiary of P&O Australia, 
(30%). The concession is for ten years, and began in March 1996. The project required an initial 
investment of $7.4 million (MIPS 1998), including two new cranes. According to the CEO of MIPS, about 
12 000 containers were handled in 1998 (10 000 imports, 2 000 exports). By far, the bulk of container traffic 
is made up of consumer goods for domestic consumption in Mozambique (in other words not exports 
from or imports to South Africa). MIPS has a target of 100 000 containers made up of 20 000 imports for 
local consumption, 40 000 inward to Southern Africa, and 40 000 outward from Southern Africa. (As a 
comparison, the Durban port handles about 1 million containers a year). 
Two international shipping lines, Macs and Maersk, make regular calls at the container terminal, 
linking Maputo to Europe and more recently the Far East. There is something of a chicken-and-egg 
situation here that is important to understand: In order to attract more container traffic, the port needs to 
attract more shipping lines, but in order to attract more shipping lines, there has to be more cargo (see 
Section 5.2). Mozal has concluded an agreement with CFM to build and operate its own berth and other 
terminal facilities at Matola (a section of the Maputo port). The total cost will be $70 million, including 
$14 million for the new berth. Ownership of the facilities will eventually revert to CFM (Business Report 
27.08.98). 
At any port, in addition to the services provided at individual terminals, there are  general port and 
upkeep services that are essential. These are also to be concessioned to the private sector. In May 1998, a 
consortium led by Merseyside Docks and Harbour Company (a UK company) was named the preferred 
bidder for this concession. The $85 million concession includes dredging the port channel to increase the 
depth from 9.5 to 13.5 metres, as well as managing, organising and maintaining port facilities 
(Mpumalanga Report 1998). 
However, the Mersey Docks consortium is reluctant to finalise the concession until more progress has 
been made with the concession for the Ressano Garcia railway line. Mersey Docks wants to be sure that 
Spoornet is involved in the railway line, since Spoornet would have the ability to re-route goods from 
other lines to the Maputo port. The stalemate surrounding the port and rail concessions has resulted in 
unexpected delays in the upgrading of these key elements of the MDC’s infrastructure.4 
3.4 The border post 
The border post is the final major infrastructure element of the MDC. A new, twenty-four hour, one-
stop border post is being planned. It will cost $33 million and take three years to build. A great deal 
of planning has gone into the design of the new border post. According to the Mpumalanga Report 
(1999), the South African Cabinet has now authorised the National Interdepartmental Structure for 
                                                                 
4 The original expectation was to announce the preferred bidder for the port in December 1997, award the 
contract by February 1998, and begin construction by mid-1998. Each of these stages has taken longer than 
expected. 
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Border Control (NIDS) to go ahead with a Rapid Procurement Programme to begin upgrading the 
border post. 
At the moment, passengers and vehicles going through the border post have to go through two 
separate sides. The border post closes at 7 p.m., so anyone arriving after that time has to wait there until 
the next morning. According to the South African Road Freight Association, the average processing time 
at the border  
 
post is two hours. Kennedy et al. (1998) found an average processing time of four hours for freight 
vehicles. According to Mocargo in Mozambique, each of their trucks spends three to six hours at the 
border post, and Kawena Cargo Carrier Company reported between one-and-a-half and six hours. The 
new border post should reduce these times dramatically. The new Lebombo border post is being seen as 
a pilot project. If it is successful, the same model will be implemented at other border posts in the region. 
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4. Freight, vehicle and passenger flows along the Maputo corridor 
4.1 Freight flows 
Detailed information about current freight flows along the Maputo corridor route proved difficult to 
come by. Neither Mozambique nor South Africa has a national freight database with data on freight 
flows broken down by route, mode and commodity. Nevertheless, it was possible to piece together 
information from various sources. Ideally one wants to distinguish between: 
· domestic and cross-border freight; 
· different modes (road and rail in this case); 
· commodity types; 
· different origin-destination pairs. 
Moving South Africa (1998) gives figures for aggregate annual freight flows along major transport 
corridors. A figure of 9 million tons is given for the Gauteng-Maputo corridor, with a prediction of 25 
million tons for the year 2020. The current figure of 9 million tons is made up of 6.9 million tons of rail 
freight and 1.8 million tons of road freight.5 These figures include both domestic and international traffic 
going in both directions. 
The CSIR did a survey of passenger and freight flows by road through South Africa’s border posts in 
1997 (Kennedy, Sallie & Nordengen 1998), which provides useful information. The survey was done over 
three separate weeks at different times of the year, and the data collected was then annualised. This 
means that the results are estimates, however, they seem to be the most detailed and reliable estimates 
available for cross-border road freight. Figure 2 shows the proportion of total cross-border road freight 
volumes accounted for by each of South Africa’s border posts. 
The graph shows clearly that road freight flows through the Lebombo border post6 are small from 
South Africa’s point of view. In 1997, just over 29 000 tons of goods passed through the Lebombo border 
post by road (compared to 1.2 million tons through Beitbridge, for example). Figure 3 shows road freight 
flows consolidated by country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
5 This breakdown is not given in the Moving South Africa document, but Nathan Wilson (Policy Advisor: Freight 
Infrastructure at the South African Department of Transport) was able to provide the breakdown. 
6 The border post is referred to as the Lebombo border post rather than the Ressano Garcia border post, since 
the CSIR study was done in South Africa. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of total cross-border road freight between SA and neighbouring 
countries per border post, 1993 & 1997 
Source: Data from Kennedy et al. (1998) 
Figure 3: Estimated annual cross-border road freight volumes between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries, 1993 & 1997 
Source: Data from Kennedy et al. (1998) 
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The 29 000 tons of cross-border road freight between South Africa and Mozambique in 1997 was 
made up of 26 000 tons of goods going from South Africa to Mozambique, and 3 000 tons going from 
Mozambique to South Africa. Kennedy et al. (1998) give a breakdown of the commodities involved, 
shown in Table1. 
Altogether, vegetables and fruit products, cement and building products, miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, and prepared foodstuffs, beverages etc., going from South Africa to Mozambique, 
accounted for just over 13 400 tons or 46% of the total road freight flows between the two countries in 
1997. This was before the construction of Mozal began in mid-1998, which is likely to have increased the 
volumes of construction materials going through the border post from South Africa to Mozambique. 
The main single road freight flow between South Africa and Mozambique thus consists of basic 
consumer goods and construction materials going from South Africa to Mozambique. Presumably, the 
majority of these goods are destined for local consumption in the Mozambican market (rather than for 
export to other countries via the port of Maputo). 
Table 1: Road freight percentages by commodity through the Lebombo border post, 1997 
Commodity From Moz (%) From SA (%) Total (%) 
Vegetables and fruit products 33 22 23 
Cement and building materials  6 13 13 
Ferrous metals  14 11 11 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 22 7 9 
Plastics and articles thereof 0 7 7 
Vehicles, aircraft, ships, boats, vessels, 
transport equipment 
0 7 7 
Wood and articles of wood, charcoal, 
cork 
5 6 6 
Prepared food stuff, beverages, spirits, 
canned food, tobacco 
1 6 5 
Live animals, animal products 19 2 4 
Animal and vegetable fats and oil  4 3 
Pulp of wood, cellulose material, 
paperboard, paper 
0 3 3 
General mining products 0 3 3 
Other products 0 9 6 
TOTAL 100 
(3 000 tons) 
100 
(26 000 tons) 
100 
(29 000 tons) 
Source: Data from Kennedy et al. (1998) 
Thinking back to the Moving South Africa figures, it is clear that of the 1.8 million tons of road freight 
which travel along the Maputo corridor route, only a very small proportion (29 000 tons or less than 2%) 
is cross-border freight. The vast majority of the 1.8 million tons is likely to be accounted for by freight 
moving between destinations within South Africa.7 Some of it will be made up of goods moving between 
destinations within Mozambique, but given the relative sizes of the Mozambican and South African 
economies, this is likely to be a much smaller amount than the amount within South Africa. 
A breakdown of cross-border road traffic through the Lebombo border post by origin-destination 
pairs reveals interesting results. Figure 4 is based on information provided by Kennedy et al. (1998) on 
origin-destination pairs. 
                                                                 
7 According to Statistics South Africa (1999), the combined road and rail freight tonnage for the whole of South 
Africa in 1998 was 625 million tons, made up of 448 million tons transported by private freight operators, and 187 
million by Transnet. No further breakdown is available from Statistics South Africa. 
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Figure 4: Origin-destination pairs for traffic at the Lebombo border post, 1997 
Source: Based on data from Kennedy et al. (1998) 
 
Figure 5: Rail freight volumes between South Africa and other countries, 1995-1997 
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Source: Kennedy et al. (1998) (based on data from Spoornet) 
Goods moving from Gauteng to Maputo are, by far, the dominant freight flow. We will return to a 
discussion of vehicle and passenger flows further on in this section. Note that the only other South 
African province that features significantly is Mpumalanga, with the Northern Province putting in a 
small appearance. Flows to and from South Africa’s other provinces, Mozambique’s other provinces, 
and other countries in the region, were too small to show up on the graph. Kennedy et al. (1998) also 
give aggregate data for rail freight flows, provided to them by Spoornet.  
Figure 5 shows that Mozambique-South Africa cross-border rail freight flows are far greater than 
Mozambique-South Africa cross-border road freight flows (refer to figure 3). Whereas Mozambique 
accounts for only a small proportion of cross-border road freight flows between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries, Mozambique accounts for a significant proportion of cross-border rail freight 
flows between South Africa and neighbouring countries. 
The composition of goods transported on the Ressano Garcia line in 1997 is shown in Table 2. (See 
Section C of the Appendix for 1995 and 1996 figures.) 
The flow of goods from South Africa to Mozambique far outweighs the flow of goods in the opposite 
direction. Of the 1.2 million tons of cross-border rail freight between South Africa and Mozambique in 
1997, 1.17 million tons was from South Africa to Mozambique, and only 30 000 tons was from 
Mozambique to South Africa. The dominant commodities, together making up 84% of total flows in both 
directions in 1997, are coal and citrus from Mpumalanga, which are destined for export via the port of 
Maputo. Coal volumes have increased rapidly over the last three years, and 20% twenty percent of South 
Africa’s citrus exports go through Maputo. Continued growth in the volumes of both of these products is 
expected (SA Transport Business Special 1997). According to a railway specialist at the Southern African 
Transport and Telecommunications Commission (SATCC), increases in rail volumes have been possible 
because of improvements in the management of the railway, even though the rail infrastructure has not 
yet been upgraded. 
Table 2: Goods transported on the Ressano Garicia railway line, 1997 (tons) 
Into Mozambique 
Coal 949 272 
Steel 8 000 
Citrus 166 702 
Vermiculite 3 256 
Clinker 38 766 
Containers 9 114 
Cement 39 780 
Various 30 678 
Molasses  22 560 
Sugar 2 898 
Maize 18 647 
Chrome 851 
TOTAL 1 290 524 
Out of Mozambique 
Steel 2 240 
Semea 7 792 
Bentonite 7 288 
Various 7 510 
Vehicles 12 760 
TOTAL 37 590 
Source: CFM Traffic Section (Direcção dos  
Caminhos de Ferro de Mocambique, Departamento de  
Tráfego, Secção de Estatistica, CFM) 
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To summarise, there are two major cross-border freight flows between South Africa and 
Mozambique. 
· bulk rail freight, involving bulk goods from Mpumalanga destined for export through the port of 
Maputo; 
· road freight, involving goods from Gauteng destined for consumption within Mozambique. 
 
4.2 Vehicle and passenger flows 
Data on vehicle flows on the Witbank-Maputo toll road is available from TRAC, but at this stage only 
for South Africa. At the moment, approximately 10 000 light vehicles and 1 000 heavy vehicles go 
through the Middelburg toll plaza every day. The figures for the Machado toll plaza are 
approximately 5 000 light vehicles and 900 heavy vehicles per day. (The opening of the toll plazas has 
influenced the amount of traffic. This is discussed further in Section 5.) 
Bearing in mind the relative sizes of the South African and Mozambican economies, it is likely that 
levels of traffic on the Mozambican side of the road are lower. According to a member of the Lenders 
Team for the toll road (made up of all the organisations that have contributed to the loan financing for 
the road), more than 90% of the revenue from tolls is expected to come from traffic on the South African 
part of the road. 
For vehicle flows, as for freight flows, cross-border traffic is a small proportion of total traffic along 
the route. (Most of the traffic is either within South Africa or within Mozambique.) According to data 
from the South African Revenue Service (SARS) office at the Lebombo border post, the average number 
of vehicles going through the border post every day is around 800. Figure 7 shows how this daily 
average has changed from month to month since April 1997. 
Surprisingly, although there are considerable variations from month to month, with large peaks in 
some months, there is no overall upward trend, even since the construction of Mozal began in mid-1998. 
It might be tempting to conclude that the dramatic (but temporary) jump in the average number of 
vehicles per day in December 1997 and early 1998 can be explained by holiday traffic. However, as 
Figure 7 shows, there was no corresponding increase in the number of passengers travelling from South 
Africa to Mozambique in those months (although there was a jump in the number of passengers 
travelling to South Africa in December 1997, and a jump in the number as passengers travelling to 
Mozambique in December 1998.)  
 
Figure 6: Average number of vehicles going through the Lebombo border post per day, 
April 1997-May 1999 
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Source: Based on data from SARS 
 
Figure 7: Number of passengers going through the Lebombo border post per month, April 
1997-March 1999 
Source: Based on data from SARS 
Based on these figures from SARS, the average number of passengers per vehicle over the whole time 
period was 2.3. The average number of passengers per vehicle in the 1997 survey done by Kennedy et al. 
(1998) was 3.9. 
Table 3 shows a breakdown of the people that moved through the border post in May 1999, based on 
statistics from Mozambique. 
Table 3: Movement of people through the Ressano Garcia border post by road, May 1999 
 
Category Into Moz Out of Moz  Total 
Mozambicans resident in Moz 6 722 11 152 17 924 
Mozambicans resident outside Moz 1 542 3 084 4 626 
National diplomats resident in Moz 3 437 998 4 435 
National diplomats resident outside Moz 19 65 84 
Miners 16 770 19 161 35 931 
National repatriates from outside 4 762  4 762 
Foreigners resident in Moz 3 208 2 145 5 353 
Foreign diplomats resident in Moz 192 153 345 
Foreign diplomats resident out of Moz 7 3 10 
Foreign repatriates  16 16 
Border facilities of nationals 2 511 2 511 5 020 
Border facilities of foreigners 709 709 1 418 
TOTAL 45 690 45 221 90 911 
 
Source: Mozambican National Directorate of Migration (Direcção Nacional de Migração, 1999, Relatório sobre o 
movimento migratório na Provincia de Maputo no posto de Ressano Garcia.) 
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Miners make up by far the largest category, followed by Mozambicans resident in Mozambique.8 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large numbers of Mozambicans travel to Mpumalanga, and 
particularly Nelspruit, to shop. 
It seems that passenger flows by rail are much smaller than passenger flows by road between South 
Africa and Mozambique. Table 4 shows the number of passengers per month on the Interpax Passenger 
Train between Maputo and Johannesburg in 1998. 
The railway journey takes 17 hours each way, and makes 28 stops between Maputo and 
Johannesburg, according to Spoornet’s timetable (Spoornet website 1999). According to CFM, the 
majority of passengers (between 77% and 86%) are small scale traders or businesses, attracted by the 
relatively cheaper tariffs offered for this kind of transport. For CFM, passenger transport earns much less 
revenue than transport of goods. In fact, passenger transport is cross-subsidised by revenue from 
transport of goods.  
Table 4: Passengers on the Interpax Passenger Train between Maputo and 
Johannesburg, 1998 
 
 No. of passengers 
January 3 734 
February 3 037 
March 2 972 
April 3 724 
May 3 417 
June 2 924 
July 2 277 
August 1 902 
September 2 228 
October 1 986 
November 1 974 
December 3 219 
TOTAL 33 394 
 
Source: Railway Directorate, Traffic Department, Statistical Section, CFM, June 1999 
                                                                 
8 Although it is not clear to what extent this is a consistent pattern, from month to month. 
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5. The impact of the MDC on freight flows 
Originally, the focus of this study was going to be more narrowly on freight transport costs along the 
Maputo corridor route, and how these would change as a result of the infrastructure upgrades that 
form part of the MDC. We hoped that this would enable us to say something about the likely impact 
of the infrastructure upgrades on investment patterns. However, three things became clear. Firstly, 
with much of the infrastructure not yet in place, detailed calculations of transport costs would be 
premature and would not yield definite answers. Secondly, the information needed to make such 
calculations is not necessarily available.9 Thirdly, even if one could say with certainty how transport 
costs for various goods would be affected, it may still not be possible to say anything about the 
aggregate impact of the infrastructure upgrades on investment patterns, because there are a number 
of wider factors involved. These wider factors are arguably more important than the direct impact of 
the infrastructure upgrades on transport costs, in determining the impact of the MDC. 
The discussion below looks at some of the factors that influence road freight transport costs along the 
Maputo corridor (since the road is the part of the corridor’s infrastructure that is most developed), and 
then at some of the broader factors which influence the impact of the MDC. 
5.1 Road freight transport costs 
Road freight operators face a variety of costs. According to the Road Freight Association in South 
Africa, the main fixed costs are capital and finance for vehicles, depreciation, insurance, staff, 
administration, licences, and scheduled maintenance. The main variable costs are fuel, lubricants, 
variable maintenance, and tyres. For light delivery vehicles, the biggest contributors to total costs are 
staff and vehicle costs. These vehicles would seldom be used for long-distance journeys. For heavy 
vehicles, diesel and staff costs are the biggest contributors to total costs. 
The upgraded Witbank-Maputo road will undoubtedly be a better road than the old road, and it will 
be 20km shorter. These two factors together will make the journey time shorter, and reduce costs such as 
fuel and maintenance costs. 
Once the new streamlined border post is in place, the journey time will be further reduced. In 
addition, the 24-hour border post will allow more flexibility in planning trips, and may allow for 
additional trips to be made. There will also be less directly calculable cost savings, for example from 
improved security along the road in the form of patrols and SOS phones. For fragile cargo, such as fruit 
and bottles, the better quality road will mean less chance of damage – another cost saving. 
However, in return for all these benefits, users of the route now have to pay tolls. Table 5 shows the 
toll tariffs at the three toll plazas in South Africa. (Note that local residents and commuters are eligible for 
discounts.) The toll tariffs at the toll plazas in Mozambique have yet to be decided on.  
Table 5: Toll tariffs for normal users on the Witbank-Maputo toll road 
Toll plaza Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Middelburg R20.00 R40.00 R60.00 R80.00 
Machado R30.00 R80.00 R120.00 R170.00 
Nkomazi R21.00 R44.00 R65.00 R92.50 
Total R71.00 R164.00 R245.00 R342.50 
Class 1: Light vehicles (cars and bakkies, including trailers and caravans) 
Class 2: Medium heavy vehicles 
Class 3: Large heavy vehicles 
Class 4: Extra large heavy vehicles 
Source: Information supplied by TRAC 
                                                                 
9 The World Bank has recently undertaken a study on transport costs along eight corridors in SADC, and has 
found that there are significant data gaps that “need to be at least partially covered to arrive at meaningful 
conclusions in the analysis” (Freight and Trading Weekly 1999).  
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As can be seen, the toll tariffs are substantial. A heavy vehicle travelling the whole route has to pay 
R342.50 at the moment, and this will increase once the last two plazas are opened. Is this increase in costs 
compensated for by the cost savings that result from an improved road and decreased journey times? 
Reactions of road users to the new tolls may provide some insight. 
Figures from TRAC show that the opening of the first two toll plazas led to substantial reductions in 
the number of vehicles using the road. At Middelburg, the average number of heavy vehicles per day 
during the 20 weeks before the toll plaza opened in December 1998 was just over 2 100. This has dropped 
to approximately 1 000, with no sign of an upward trend towards previous levels.10 At Machadodorp, the 
average number of heavy vehicles per day during the 46 weeks before the toll plaza opened in May 1999 
was approximately 1 400. This has dropped to approximately 900. (It is too soon to tell whether there is 
an upward trend towards previous levels.) The numbers of light vehicles going through both toll plazas 
also decreased, but less dramatically. 
According to an engineer at TRAC, only about 2% of the decrease in traffic is due to trip suppression 
(in other words, to fewer trips being made), and most of this will be for light vehicles. Most of the 
decrease in traffic is accounted for by trip diversion, in other words, by vehicles taking different routes in 
order to avoid the toll plazas. 
There are two types of trip diversion: local and long distance. For long distance trips (for example, 
between Johannesburg and Maputo), trip diversion options are limited. Vehicles could take the N17 
(south of the N4 Witbank-Maputo road), but that involves going through Swaziland. Another option is 
the R38, also south of the N4, which rejoins the N4 east of Nelspruit, and so would only result in partial 
avoidance of the tolls. The R38 also involves travelling over several mountain passes. Local trip diversion 
options are more attractive at Middelburg than at Machadodorp, and least attractive of all at the 
Nkomazi toll plaza, where there has apparently been almost no reduction in traffic subsequent to the 
opening of the toll plaza. 
Unsurprisingly, it seems that the extent of the decrease in traffic at the toll plazas is related to the 
attractiveness of alternative local routes around each toll plaza. What is not clear is whether long distance 
freight operators are avoiding the plazas by taking local alternative routes and then rejoining the N4 in-
between the toll plazas. 
However, whether freight operators are avoiding the toll plazas or not does not necessarily tell us 
anything about whether the costs of the tolls are being compensated for, since of course road users who 
are not used to paying tolls on a particular route are not going to be happy about the introduction of tolls 
on that route. The extra cost of the tolls may be felt more directly than cost savings from improved 
quality of the road. Also, this is the first time in Southern Africa that there are tolls that reflect the full cost 
of the investment in and maintenance of road infrastructure. Tolls on other roads, including notably the 
N3 between Johannesburg and Durban, are still subsidised (in other words, the toll tariffs are not 
designed to cover the full cost of road building and maintenance). 
When the toll plazas in Mozambique open, the tolls may be resented less there because the 
improvement in the quality of the road will be more dramatic. Mozambican companies interviewed 
seemed to think that the improvements in the quality of road and the accompanying benefits would 
compensate for the cost of the tolls. Companies suggested that a better road, combined with the new 
border post, would enable them to make more trips and increase their turnover, which would in turn 
enable them to absorb the cost of the tolls. (The research did not attempt to deal with the potential 
reactions of local residents in Mozambique). 
                                                                 
10 The exact figures are obviously sensitive information from TRAC’s point of view, and TRAC requested that 
they not be included here. 
DPRU WORKING PAPER 
20  
According to the South African Road Freight Association (RFA), approximately 70% of the cost of the 
tolls is compensated for by improved quality and reduced journey times. Also, according to the RFA, for 
an average 30-ton payload, the tolls add approximately 18% to the cost of the journey between 
Johannesburg and Maputo. The road freight industry is a highly competitive one in South Africa. Some 
members of the RFA are passing on the full cost of the tolls to their customers (in effect billing their 
customers directly for the tolls, in spite of cost savings due to the improved quality of the road). It is not 
clear whether all operators are doing this. Over time, because of competition between operators, any net 
increases in cost resulting from the tolls might be absorbed by the operators. 
Apart from diesel and staff costs (mentioned earlier as the major contributors to the cost of a long 
distance journey), there is a further factor that can have a substantial impact on the costs of a road freight 
operator in relation to revenue. This factor is the extent of backhaul opportunities, in other words, the 
extent to which trucks can carry loads in both directions. At the moment, trucks often carry a load from 
South Africa to Mozambique, and then return empty. Only one half of the journey generates revenue for 
the freight operator. 
This is obviously partly a reflection of the economic relationship between the two countries. As the 
Mozambican economy develops, there will no doubt be increased opportunities for carrying revenue-
generating loads in both directions. However, it is also a reflection of the fact that port of Maputo is not 
used to import goods into South Africa. If some of the goods that are currently imported through the 
Durban port were to be imported through the container terminal at the Maputo port, this would provide 
a ready supply of return loads for road freight operators.  
It should be noted that there is a concern amongst Mozambican freight companies that South African 
road operators may start operating in Mozambique, and with greater financial and other resources at 
their disposal, displace Mozambican operators. For example, at the moment, small Mozambican 
operators play a role in transporting goods from the road terminal to their final destinations. Once the 
road is improved, South African companies may choose to take goods to their final destination in 
Maputo, rather than just to the terminal. 
Overall, there can be no doubt that the combined effect of the upgraded Maputo corridor road and 
the new border post will make the journey between Maputo and Johannesburg quicker, safer, and less 
wear-and-tear-inducing. Initially, this might be accompanied by somewhat increased road freight costs 
as a result of the tolls. However, assuming that increased efficiency and reliability will lead to increased 
volumes in both directions over time, the longer-term impact is likely to be a decrease in freight transport 
costs along the route. Because of the competitive nature of the road freight industry, it is likely that these 
cost savings will be passed on to customers. 
5.2 Broader factors 
Arguably more important than direct transport costs along the MDC are a number of broader factors 
that will influence the impact of the corridor. These include: 
· the price of the tolls on the N3 to Durban; 
· how the port of Maputo fits into global shipping networks; 
· the evolution of the port system on Southern Africa’s east coast. 
Firstly, it is important to understand that when it comes to imports to and exports from South Africa, 
the Maputo corridor route is in many ways a competitor with the route between Johannesburg and the 
Durban port. The “captive hinterland” of the Maputo port is small – it does not extend much beyond 
Mpumalanga. Beyond that, the distance to Maputo and the distance to Durban start to equal out. 
However, even though Maputo is physically slightly closer to Gauteng than Durban is, the travelling 
time to Maputo is still greater. According to the Road Freight Association, a return journey to Maputo 
takes 18 hours, compared with 14 hours to Durban and back. But the 18 hours to Maputo includes two 
hours at the border post each way, so once the new border post is in place, and the road upgrade is 
completed, the journey time to Maputo will compare much more favourably with the journey time to 
Durban. (It will still be a while though before this happens.) 
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At the same time, the tolls on the N3 to Durban are set to increase. As noted earlier, these tolls are 
currently at subsidised levels. However, in May 1999, a concession for upgrading the N3, similar to the 
Witbank-Maputo toll road concession, was signed with a company called N3TC. It will take a couple of 
years for the new tolls to come into effect, but once they do, “then you can start to compare apples with 
apples”, as one interviewee put it. This will provide a further boost for the Maputo corridor route. 
Another major factor in this contest between Maputo and Durban is the state of their respective ports. 
The port of Durban is congested (and its expansion is physically constrained by lack of land), but its size 
means that it is better connected into global shipping networks that the port of Maputo. Far more 
shipping lines call far more regularly at the Durban port than at the Maputo port. As explained in Section 
3, there is a chicken-and-egg situation involved here. Unless more cargo comes to the Maputo port, 
shipping lines will be reluctant to call there; unless more shipping lines call, cargo owners will be 
reluctant to send their cargo there. 
 
 
However, even without the chicken-and-egg problem, it would not be easy for the Maputo port to 
compete with Durban for shipping lines, because of the nature of the global shipping system. Over the 
last decade at least, the trend in world shipping has been towards a hub-and-spoke system. In the past, 
container ships would call at all ports along a particular route. With increasing ship sizes and other 
changes in the shipping industry, it now makes more sense for ships to call at one port along a coastline 
(the so-called hub port), and for goods to be transhipped from there to the smaller ports along the 
coastline (the so-called feeder ports). Although for various reasons this hub-and-spoke system has not 
been fully implemented in Southern Africa, it is only a matter of time before it is. Of the ports along 
Southern Africa’s east coast, Durban seems the most likely candidate as a hub port for container 
shipping. 
As Prof. Trevor Jones of the University of Natal explains, “At present Durban is the only South 
African container port with any remote pretension to hub status, and it is overwhelmingly supported by 
the carriers as the choice for future terminal expansion. … The carriers strongly favour the concentration 
of their eastern seaboard southern African activities in a single port, and even more strongly oppose a 
split of mainstream container-handling facilities across neighbouring ports such as Durban and Richards 
Bay, thereby requiring two port calls within a 100 nautical mile range” (quoted in Freight and Trading 
Weekly 1998). 
It seems that the port of Maputo’s status as a niche port for bulk goods from Mpumalanga is secure. 
Growth areas for the port are seen in “its traditional exports of coal, sugar, citrus and fertiliser” (SA 
Transport Business Special 1997: 17). The dominant transport mode for these goods will probably remain 
rail, because of the nature of the goods. The picture for container traffic is far more open-ended, and yet 
vital in determining the overall impact of the corridor. As discussed in Section 5.1, one of the most 
significant ways of reducing road freight costs along the Maputo corridor route is increased 
opportunities for return loads, and this will depend crucially on the level of imports destined for 
Gauteng (or other inland locations) that come through the Maputo port. 
For both road and rail freight, it is important to have all the links in the logistics chain in place before 
the full benefits of reductions in costs and improvements in efficiency can be felt. If the border post is not 
functioning properly, or if the port has not been dredged, the full impact of the corridor is not going to be 
felt. The link between the railway line and the port is already strong, since most of the rail traffic is 
destined for export through the port. Most of the road freight transported along the corridor at the 
moment is not linked to the port. However, without port facilities being in place, there is no real chance 
of developing a strong relationship between road freight and the port, for imports or exports. 
A common view expressed was that once the new border post is in place, once general port services at 
the port of Maputo are in place, and once the new higher tolls on the N3 are in place, then the Maputo 
corridor route will begin to emerge as a real alternative to the Johannesburg-Durban route, for imports 
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and exports. However, the consolidation of shipping lines around a single hub port along the east coast 
of Southern Africa may mean that the Durban port is further strengthened in relation to Maputo in spite 
of this. 
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6. Conclusions and recommendations 
To summarise briefly, there are currently two main freight flows along the Maputo corridor route: a 
bulk rail freight flow, consisting of goods from Mpumalanga destined for export through the Maputo 
port; and a road freight flow, consisting mainly of goods from Gauteng for domestic consumption 
within Mozambique. The improved quality of the upgraded road, combined with reduced journey 
times, is likely to lead to decreased road freight costs over time, in spite of the cost of the tolls on the 
road. The other major factor that will influence road freight costs is the extent of return haul 
opportunities. This will be affected by the growth of the Mozambican economy, and by the level of 
imports to South Africa through the Maputo port.  
The role of the Maputo port as a niche bulk port for goods from Mpumalanga is secure. However, if 
the container terminal is to develop substantially, all the road- and border post-related infrastructure 
needs to be in place, and competition with the Durban port is involved. This takes place within the 
context of the move towards a hub port system on Southern Africa’s east coast. 
It is early days yet for the Maputo Development Corridor. Perhaps one of the main conclusions which 
emerges out of this research is that it is important to be realistic about time frames when one is thinking 
about the impact of development corridors in SADC. Four years since it was conceptualised, the MDC is 
certainly a reality and much has been achieved. However, there is a long way to go. This should not be 
seen as a failing, but it should tell us that large infrastructure investments take time, and that their 
impacts will not be felt overnight. The most rapid response to the MDC has come from a traditional area 
of strength along the corridor route: bulk exports from Mpumalanga. This is an area in which the MDC is 
re-establishing an old relationship rather than building a new one. Breaking new ground (for example, 
container imports to South Africa via the Maputo corridor) is proving more intractable. 
 A second conclusion is that the impact of the MDC will be partly determined by factors outside of the 
MDC itself, notably the future of the N3 to Durban and  developments in international shipping, 
although there are probably others as well. For any development corridor, such “external” factors will 
exist. It is important to understand what they are, but there is no formula for working them out. They 
need to be examined on a case by case basis. 
Thirdly, freight, vehicle and passenger movements may be useful indicators of impacts, and of wider 
factors at work. Ideally a regional freight database should be developed. However, given that developing 
such a database in South Africa is proving less than straightforward11 this is an ambitious goal to say the 
least. There may be ways of collecting more systematic information on a corridor by corridor basis 
though. 
Finally, this research raises questions about how one goes about studying the economic impact of a 
major initiative such as the MDC as it is unfolding. What should be the aims of our research at this stage? 
What data should be collected and monitored, and what can one expect to discover from it? To what 
extent are any findings generalisable to other corridors in the region? Answers to these questions are 
important from the point of view of both the MDC and other corridors in the region. 
Does all of this tell us anything about the relationship between infrastructure and economic 
development? 
                                                                 
11 The CSIR (Transportek) and the South African Department of Transport are engaged in discussions about the 
possibility of establishing such a database for South Africa. 
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Appendix 
A: South African and Mozambican trade 
Table 9: Mozambique’s main trading partners, 1996 
Exports US$ (1000) %  Imports US$ (1000) % 
Spain 47.6 21.1  South Africa 259.7 33.2 
South Africa 43.8 19.4  Portugal 49.3 6.3 
India 26.8 11.8  India 35.8 4.6 
USA 25.8 11.4  France 34.8 4.4 
Portugal 17.5 7.7  Italy 32.7 4.2 
Japan 17.2 7.6  USA 32.6 4.2 
Zimbabwe 9.8 4.4  Japan 31.0 4.0 
Tanzania 4.0 1.8  Zimbabwe 30.8 3.9 
Netherlands 3.5 1.5  Germany 20.7 2.6 
Others 30.1 13.3  UK 18.2 2.3 
    Others 237.0 30.3 
TOTAL 226.1 100.0  TOTAL 782.6 100.0 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 1996. Estatísticas do comércio externo, exportações e importações. 
 
Table 10: Mozambique trade with SADC, 1996 
 
Exports US$ (1000) %  Imports US$ (1000) % 
South Africa 43.8 73.4  South Africa 259.7 83.3 
Zimbabwe 9.8 16.5  Zimbabwe 30.8 9.8 
Malawi 1.4 2.3  Malawi 10.7 3.4 
Angola 0.4 0.8  Angola 0.0 0.0 
Mauritius    Mauritius   
Tanzania 4.0 6.6  Tanzania 0.1 0.0 
Namibia    Namibia 0.3 0.1 
Zambia 0.1 0.2  Zambia 0.2 0.1 
Swaziland 0.1 0.2  Swaziland 10.3 3.3 
Botswana 0.0 0.0  Botswana 0.0 0.0 
Lesotho 0.0 0.0  Lesotho 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 59.6 100.0  TOTAL 312.1 100.0 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 1996. Estatísticas do comércio externo, exportações e importações. 
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Table 11: South Africa’s main trading partners, 1991-1995 ($ billion) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Exports      
Italy 2.2 2.3 0.4 0.5 2.5 
Japan 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.2 2.3 
USA 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.2 2.1 
Germany 1.7 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.7 
UK 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.6 
South Korea 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.1 
Taiwan 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.9 
Belgium-Lux. 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Zimbabwe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 
China   0.2 0.2 0.6 
Imports      
Germany 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.7 4.0 
UK 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.9 
USA 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8 
Japan 1.6 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.5 
Italy 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 
France 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Taiwan 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.0 
Hong Kong 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 
China   0.3 0.4 0.6 
Belgium-Lux. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Exports: CIF value at country of arrival, except USA 
Imports: FOB value at point of departure 
Source: Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 1998 
B: Decline of Mozambican port and railway traffic from 1975 
Table 12: National and international traffic in Mozambican ports, 1975-1992 (million 
tons) 
 
 National traffic International 
traffic 
Total 
1975 1.0 13.8 14.8 
1976 1.0 10.8 11.8 
1977 1.2 9.4 10.6 
1978 1.9 8.2 10.1 
1979 1.2 9.7 10.9 
1980 1.6 8.3 9.9 
1981 1.3 7.7 9.0 
1982 1.4 7.5 8.9 
1983 1.3 5.2 6.5 
1984 0.9 4.6 5.5 
1985 0.5 4.0 4.5 
1986 0.6 3.6 4.2 
1987 0.9 4.2 5.1 
1988 1.1 4.6 5.7 
1989 1.1 5.3 6.4 
1990 1.1 4.2 5.3 
1991 0.1 3.8 4.7 
Source: Comissão Nacional do Plano, Informação estatistica sobre transporte e communicações, 1975-1984; 
Comissão Nacional do Plano, Informação estatistica sobre transporte e communicações, 1989; EIU, 
Mozambique Country Profile, 1994. 
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Table 13: Cargo carried by CFM, 1975-1994 (thousand tons) 
 
 Total National Inter-
national 
CFM-South CFM-
Central 
CFM-North 
1975 13 380 2 174 11 216 9 838 2 928 439 
1976 10 285 2 402 7 983 7 763 2 048 433 
1977 9 126 2 197 6 929 6 839 1 799 367 
1978 8 550 1 978 6 672 8 521 1 706 394 
1979 8 880 2 073 6 807 6 849 1 519 476 
1980 7 549 1 993 5 554 5 548 1 608 452 
1981 7 769 2 409 6 358 5 482 1 816 434 
1982 6 742 2 071 4 571 4 581 1 383 419 
1983 4 396 1 256 3 100 3 466 485 392 
1984 3 698 1 243 2 455 3 171 296 211 
1985 2 837 690 2 217 2 521 307 49 
1986 2 949 649 2 300 2 643 368 32 
1987 3 210 1 326 1 883 2 334 482 385 
1988 2 719 1 010 1 709 2 117 459 100 
1989 3 757 1 413 2 344 3 044 832 74 
1990 3 069 1 033 2 036 2 121 850 82 
1991 2 182 806 1 376 1 385 689 89 
1992 2 464 751 1 714 1 824 849 87 
1993 2 917 891 2 107 1 903 982 129 
1994 2 627 405 2 222 1 504 958 155 
Source: USAID, Representação em Maputo. 1995. Um estudo sobre o movimento ferroviário em Moçambique. 
 
C: Railway traffic in Mozambique 
 
Table 14: Goods transported on the Ressano Garcia railway line, 1995-1997 (tons) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 
Into Moz    
Coal 474 083 943 986 949 272 
Steel 8 840 3 560 8 000 
Citrus 101 416 97 682 166 702 
Vermiculite 0 9 472 3 256 
Clinker 41 962 72 114 38 766 
Containers 12 369 9 324 9 114 
Cement 40 627 31 707 39 780 
Various 110 534 58 106 30 678 
Molasses   22 560 
Sugar   2 898 
Maize   18 647 
Chrome   851 
TOTAL 789831 1 225 951 1 290 524 
Out of Moz    
Steel  1 120 2 240 
Semea  6 192 7 792 
Bentonite  6 320 7 288 
Various 37 488 990 7 510 
Vehicles   12 760 
TOTAL 37 488 14 622 37 590 
Source: CFM Traffic Section (Direcção dos Caminhos-de-Ferro de Mocambique, Departamento de Tráfego, 
Secção de Estatistica, CFM) 
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Table 15: CFM railway traffic 
 
 CFM-South CFM-Central CFM-North TOTAL 
Tons 1997 1 954 700 748 100 171 900 2 847 700 
Tons 
Jan-Sept 1998 
2 247 400 559 700 195 500 3 002 600 
Passengers 
Jan-Sept 1998 
2 197 000 371 000 476 000 3 044 000 
Source: Savana, 08.01.99, Incremento do trafego ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique.         
(Savana is a Maputo newspaper.) 
 
 
Table 16: Railway distances between selected ports and cities in SADC (kms) 
 
 Dar es 
Salaam 
Beira Maputo Lobito Nacala Durban East 
London 
Zambia 
Lusaka 
Ndola 
 
2 045 
1 993 
 
2 026 
2 334 
 
2 035 
2 353 
 
2 679 
2 361 
  
2 812 
3 130 
 
3 116 
3 434 
Zimbabwe 
Harare 
Bulawayo 
  
698 
1 181 
 
1 178 
1 061 
   
2 077 
1 859 
 
2 404 
1 921 
Botswana 
Francistown 
Gaberone 
  
1 377 
1 813 
 
1 257 
1 693* 
   
1 663 
1 409 
 
1 725 
1 289 
Malawi 
Blantyre 
  
567 
 
 
  
840 
 
3 342 
 
3 669 
South Africa 
Johannesburg 
   
636 
   
777 
 
1 016 
· This is via Bulawayo; via Johannesburg the distance is 1 268km . 
 
Source: Fernando Jorge Cardoso, in: Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionnais. 1991. Africa Austral: O 
Desafio do futuro – intergração nacional e integração regional. Lisboa, Portugal. 
 
In spite of the longer distances involved, in 1998 85% of Malawi’s international trade and 60% of 
Zimbabwe’s international trade went via South African ports (Abrahamson & Nilsson 1998). 
 
D: Port traffic in Mozambique 
Table 17: Port traffic in Mozambique, Jan-Sept 1998 
 
 Maputo Beira Nacala Quelimane Pemba TOTAL 
Tons 2 166 100 1 695 400 312 000 117 000 49 000 4 339 500 
Containers 
(TEUs) 
16 774 26 700 8 893 2 406 1 536 57 309 
Source: Savana, 08.01.99, Incremento do trafego ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique. (Savana is 
a Maputo newspaper.) 
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Table 18: Cargo handled at the port of Lorenço Marques (now Maputo), 1940 to 1970 
 
 Cargo handled 
(tons) 
1940 1 772 638 
1950 4 412 695 
1960 5 806 634 
1970 13 665 799 
Source: Servicos dos Portos Camhinos-de-Ferro e Transporte. 1971. Relatório de contas dos serviços de portos, 
camhinos-de-ferro e transporte, ano económico de 1969. Lourenço Marques, Moçambique. 
 
 
Table 19: Main goods handled at the port of Maputo, 1990-1998 (thousand tons) 
Table 19a: Goods from South Africa 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Steel (a) 0 33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Asbestos 0 5 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 
Vermiculite (b) 0 0 0 0  0 15 5 0 
Coal (MCMYLER) 204 245 57 144 112 280 564 130 235 
Alloys 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal (Matola) (c) 257 137 94 267 369 113 453 672 1 020 
Steel sheet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Potassium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Citrus (d) 91 52 41 0 55 92 103 128 72 
Ferrochrome (e) 0 0 0 0  0 0 2 0 
Manganese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Granite (f) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 552 479 195 412 541 485 1 135 941 1 327 
 
(a) The prospective client is Highveld Steel in Middelburg. 
(b) The main client is the Phalaborwa Mining Company. 
(c) The main clients are Glencore SA, Benicom, and TCM. 
(d) The main client is Outspan International. 
(e) The main client is the Phalaborwa Mining Company in Witbank. 
(f)  The principal clients are Kudo Granite, Maricana Granite and Monaco Granite, all in Rustenburg, and Marlin 
Granite of Belfast and Machadodorp. 
 
Source: Commercial Directorate of CFM (Direcção Comercial dos Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique. 1999. 
Informação estatistica sobre o movimento ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique Sul.) 
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Table 19b: Goods from Zimbabwe 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Potassium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Scrap iron 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 
Steel 93 67 127 108 14 0 10 1 4 
Sugar 157 0 0 0 0 123 134 163 118 
Alloys 18 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Asbestos 19 6 1 13 0 3 0 0 0 
Granite 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Chrome ore 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 
Coal 0 0 0 0 191 318 148 257 113 
Ferrochrome 0 0 0 0 138 213 222 221 203 
Maize (export) 0 0 0 13 106 0 0 0 0 
Soya (grant) 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Rice (grant) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Maize (grant) 0 0 198 102 0 0 9 0 0 
Manure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 
Sulphur 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Steel sheet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Livestock 0 0 0 0 4 5 2 1 11 
Wheat (grant) 0 0 0 0 0 90 59 67 10 
TOTAL 287 83 407 241 470 752 596 732 461 
Source: Commercial Directorate of CFM (Direcção Comercial dos Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique. 1999. 
Informação estatistica sobre o movimento ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique Sul.) 
 
Table 19c: Goods from Swaziland 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sugar 182 6 0 0 0 130 221 205 194 
Coal 151 50 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citrus 3 3 0 4 12 13 12 13 6 
Molasses 81 58 51 39 71 29 68 73 49 
Pulp 11 11 34 62 51 24 0 0 0 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 3 16 2 0 0 
TOTAL 428 128 148 105 137 212 303 291 249 
Source: Commercial Directorate of CFM (Direcção Comercial dos Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique. 1999. 
Informação estatistica sobre o movimento ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique Sul.) 
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Table 19d: Goods from Zambia 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sugar 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 12 0 
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 12 0 
Source: Commercial Directorate of CFM (Direcção Comercial dos Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique. 1999. 
Informação estatistica sobre o movimento ferroviário nos caminhos-de-ferro de Moçambique Sul.) 
 
Table 19e: Goods from Botswana 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S/Inf. 17 
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 17 
Source: Commercial Directorate of CFM, Maputo 
